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THE CROWN’S FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS IN
THE ERA OF ABORIGINAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
Kent McNeil*
This article confronts the contention that the Crown’s fiduciary
obligations are incompatible with Aboriginal self-government. Relying
on Supreme Court decisions, it argues instead that the Crown has a
fiduciary duty to support Aboriginal autonomy. Consequently, past
infringements of the inherent right of self-government by imposition of
the band council system violated the Crown’s fiduciary obligations. The
appropriate remedy for this breach is restitution, involving federal
assistance to enable First Nations to restore and maintain their
capacity to govern themselves in accordance with their own traditions
and present-day aspirations.
Cet article vient battre en brèche l’argument voulant que les
obligations fiduciaires du gouvernement sont incompatibles avec
l’autonomie gouvernementale des Autochtones. Invoquant divers arrêts
de la Cour suprême, il fait plutôt valoir qu’il incombe à la Couronne
une obligation fiduciaire de promouvoir l’autonomie autochtone. Par
conséquent, les violations antérieures du droit inhérent à l’autonomie
gouvernementale qui découlent de la mise en place du système du
conseil de bande représentaient autant de manquements aux
obligations fiduciaires de la Couronne. La restitution est la réparation
qu’il convient d’accorder pour remédier à ces manquements, et la
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restitution exige une assistance fédérale afin de permettre aux
Premières nations de rétablir puis d’entretenir leur capacité à se
gouverner elles-mêmes, suivant leurs propres traditions et aspirations
actuelles.
The Aboriginal peoples of Canada generally assert that they have an
inherent, constitutionally-protected right of self-government that
entitles them to establish and maintain their own governmental and
legal systems. They claim that they have a government-to-government
relationship with the federal and provincial governments. At the same
time, they commonly maintain that their relationship with the Crown is
fiduciary in nature, and that the Crown owes them fiduciary obligations
in a variety of contexts. Are the government-to-government and fiduciary
relationships compatible? Or is this simply a matter of Aboriginal peoples
wanting to have it both ways?
This article examines these questions, and contends that the
fiduciary relationship has an important, ongoing role to play in the era
of Aboriginal self-government. After discussing leading Supreme Court
of Canada decisions on the Crown’s fiduciary obligations to the
Aboriginal peoples, the article relates this case law to Aboriginal
autonomy. It seeks to demonstrate that interference with that autonomy
can amount to an infringement of the inherent right of self-government
and a breach of the Crown’s fiduciary obligations. Unless the
infringement is justified in accordance with standards that the Supreme
Court has established, Aboriginal peoples should be entitled to a remedy
for the breach. The article concludes that the appropriate equitable
remedy in this context is restitution, involving federal assistance to
Aboriginal peoples to restore and implement their inherent right of self-
government.
1. The Crown’s Fiduciary Obligations
Ever since the Supreme Court of Canada first recognized in Guerin v.
The Queen1 that the Crown owes legally-enforceable fiduciary
obligations to the Aboriginal peoples, the law on this matter has been in
2 [Vol.88
1 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 [Guerin]. For background and detailed discussion, see
Leonard I. Rotman, Parallel Paths: Fiduciary Doctrine and the Crown-Native
Relationship in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996); James I.
Reynolds, A Breach of Duty: Fiduciary Obligations and Aboriginal Peoples
(Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2005). More generally, see Law Commission of Canada
and Association of Iroquois and Allied Indians, eds., In Whom We Trust: A Forum on
Fiduciary Relationships (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002).
a state of transition. Guerin involved the federal Crown’s obligations in
the context of a surrender of Indian reserve lands – a situation in which
the Crown has a duty to act in the best interests of the First Nation
whose lands are involved. But governments also have an obligation to
avoid, if possible, courses of action that are not directly in relation to
reserve lands or other interests of Aboriginal peoples, but may
negatively impact their Aboriginal or treaty rights. Because these rights
have been constitutionally protected since the enactment of section
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,2 even Parliament and the provincial
legislatures have to respect the Crown’s fiduciary obligations in order
to be able to justify any infringement of these rights. This was the
unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court in R. v. Sparrow,3 a decision
that has since been affirmed and elaborated upon in subsequent
Supreme Court judgments.4
Since Guerin, claims for breach of the Crown’s fiduciary
obligations have been advanced by Aboriginal peoples in a variety of
contexts, including negotiation and implementation of land claims
agreements and other treaties, accounting for proceeds from sale or
lease of reserve lands, expropriation of reserve lands, residential
schools, and the conduct of litigation.5 In its decision in Wewaykum
Indian Band v. Canada,6 a case involving the setting aside of lands for
Indian reserves, the Supreme Court expressed concern over the number
32009] The Crown’s Fiduciary Obligations...
2 Section 35(1) provides: “The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the
aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.”
3 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 [Sparrow].
4 See e.g. R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771; R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R.
723; R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101; R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 [Côté];
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 [Delgamuukw]; R. v. Marshall
[No. 2], [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533.
5 For some recent examples, see Stoney Band v. Canada, 2005 FCA 15, [2005]
2 C.N.L.R. 371, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 122 (September
15 2005) (no fiduciary duty owed by Crown to adversary in conduct of litigation);
Gladstone v. Canada (A.G.), 2005 SCC 21, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 325 (no fiduciary duty
owed in context of seizure of herring spawn by fisheries officers); Blackwater v. Plint,
2005 SCC 58, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 3 (breach of Crown’s fiduciary obligations in the context
of residential schools not established); Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada
(Minister of Industry), 2006 FC 132, [2006] 2 C.N.L.R. 18 (Crown has a fiduciary duty
to release census records needed to validate an Aboriginal land claim); Ermineskin
Indian Band and Nation v. Canada, 2006 FCA 415, [2007] 2 C.N.L.R. 51, aff’d 2009
SCC 9, (2009), 384 N.R. 203 (Crown’s fiduciary obligations regarding oil and gas
revenues from reserve lands); Manitoba Métis Federation Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), 2007
MBQB 293, [2008] 2 C.N.L.R. 52 at paras. 617-33 (no fiduciary duty owed to the
Métis in relation to the land grant provision in the Manitoba Act, 1870., S.C. 1870, c.
3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 8).
6 2002 SCC 79, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 245 [Wewaykum].
and range of fiduciary obligation claims being made in the courts. After
explaining that the fiduciary relationship arises from “the degree of
economic, social and proprietary control and discretion asserted by the
Crown” over Aboriginal peoples and their interests,7 Binnie J.,
delivering the unanimous decision of the Court, observed:
But there are limits. The appellants seemed at times to invoke the “fiduciary duty”
as a source of plenary Crown liability covering all aspects of the Crown-Indian band
relationship. This overshoots the mark. The fiduciary duty imposed on the Crown
does not exist at large but in relation to specific Indian interests.8
After giving examples of the “flood of ‘fiduciary duty’ claims by
Indian bands across a whole spectrum of possible complaints” brought
since Guerin, Binnie J. said he would not comment on the correctness
of these particular cases, but cautioned:
I think it desirable for the Court to affirm the principle, already mentioned, that not
all obligations existing between the parties to a fiduciary relationship are themselves
fiduciary in nature (Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., [1989]
2 S.C.R 574 at 597), and that this principle applies to the relationship between the
Crown and aboriginal peoples. It is necessary, then, to focus on the particular
obligation or interest that is the subject matter of the particular dispute and whether
or not the Crown had assumed discretionary control in relation thereto sufficient to
ground a fiduciary obligation.9
Recognizing that the Crown, unlike private persons, has public law as
well as private law duties, Binnie J. continued:
I do not suggest that the existence of a public law duty necessarily excludes the
creation of a fiduciary relationship. The latter, however, depends on identification of
a cognizable Indian interest, and the Crown’s undertaking of discretionary control in
relation thereto in a way that invokes responsibility “in the nature of a private law
duty....”10 
However, the requisite “cognizable Indian interest” need not be a
legal interest such as an interest in reserve land.11 Referring to the
4 THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW [Vol.88
7 Ibid. at 286.
8 Ibid. at 286-87.
9 Ibid. at 287-88.
10 Ibid. at 283, quoting from Dickson J.’s judgment in Guerin, supra note 1 at 385.
11 This is consistent with the law in relation to fiduciary obligations generally,
where the interests protected are not limited to proprietary or other strictly legal
interests: see e.g. McInerney v. MacDonald, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 138 (doctor’s duty to
provide patient with copies of medical records); Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ross River Dena Council Band v. Canada,12
which, like Wewaykum, involved the Crown’s fiduciary obligations in
the context of reserve creation, Binnie J. stated:
All members of the Court accepted in Ross River that potential relief by way of
fiduciary remedies is not limited to the s. 35 rights (Sparrow) or existing reserves
(Guerin). The fiduciary duty, where it exists, is called into existence to facilitate
supervision of the high degree of discretionary control gradually assumed by the
Crown over the lives of aboriginal peoples.13
In Wewaykum, Binnie J. held that the Crown did owe fiduciary
obligations to the two Indian bands in question relating to the creation
of their reserves, even though the reserve lands were not, in his view,
within their traditional territory, and even though the Crown owed no
treaty obligations to them. He found no reason, however, to interfere
with the trial judge’s decision that, on the facts, these obligations had
been met.
To this point it can be seen that, while the Aboriginal/Crown
relationship is generally fiduciary, not all aspects of the relationship give
rise to fiduciary obligations. Obligations of this sort arise in relation to
cognizable Aboriginal interests (legal or otherwise, including social and
economic interests) over which the Crown has assumed discretionary
control. The nature and extent of these obligations depend on the
circumstances.14 Additionally, where Aboriginal or treaty rights
protected by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 are concerned,
Parliament and the provincial legislatures also have to take into account
the Crown’s fiduciary obligations in the context of infringements of
those rights.15 In its recent decisions in Haida Nation v. British Columbia
52009] The Crown’s Fiduciary Obligations...
226 (doctor’s duty to not to take advantage of doctor-patient relationship); M (K) v. M
(H), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6 (parent’s duty to a child). In Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99
at 136, Wilson J. (dissenting in the result) stated that a duty arises in situations where a
“fiduciary can unilaterally exercise… power or discretion so as to affect the
beneficiary’s legal or practical interests” [emphasis added]. This statement was
approved by other members of the Supreme Court in Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International
Corona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574. See also Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994] 3
S.C.R. 377 [Hodgkinson].
12 2002 SCC 54, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 816 [Ross River].
13 Wewaykum, supra note 6 at 285.
14 See Quebec (A.G.) v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 159
at 183.
15 Note that provincial infringement of Aboriginal and treaty rights is problematic
for division-of-powers reasons, as these rights are within the core of federal jurisdiction
over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians” (Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 
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(Minister of Forests)16 and Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British
Columbia (Project Assessment Director),17 the Supreme Court of
Canada held that the Crown does not owe fiduciary obligations in the
context of Aboriginal claims to rights that have not yet been
established, but in those circumstances the honour of the Crown can
give rise to a legally-enforceable duty to consult with the Aboriginal
people in question and to accommodate their claims in appropriate
circumstances.18
2.  Fiduciary Obligations and Respect for First Nation Autonomy
Given that the Crown’s fiduciary obligations arise in circumstances
where the Crown has assumed discretionary control over Aboriginal
peoples and their interests, one can expect a certain tension to exist
between these obligations and the right of Aboriginal peoples to govern
themselves. To the extent that Aboriginal groups exercise authority
over their own affairs, the Crown’s fiduciary obligations are likely to
change, and possibly be reduced. This conclusion is supported not only
by general principles of fiduciary law, but also by the leading cases of
6 [Vol.88
31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91(24), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5), and so are protected
against provincial laws by the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity: see Delgamuukw,
supra note 4 at 1118-19 (compare ibid. at 1107 and Côté, supra note 4); R. v. Morris, 2006
SCC 59, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 915; Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700,
[2008] 1 C.N.L.R. 112 at paras. 1001-49 [Tsilhqot’in Nation]. See also Nigel Bankes,
“Delgamuukw, Division of Powers and Provincial Land and Resource Laws: Some
Implications for Provincial Resource Rights” (1998) 32 U.B.C. L. Rev. 317; Kerry
Wilkins, “Of Provinces and Section 35 Rights” (1999) 22 Dalhousie L.J. 185; Kerry
Wilkins, “Negative Capability: Of Provinces and Lands Reserved for the Indians” (2002)
1 Indigenous L.J. 57; Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Division of Powers:
Rethinking Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction” (1998) 61 Sask. L. Rev. 431 (also in Kent
McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia
(Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2001) 249 [McNeil,
Emerging Justice?]; and chapters on interjurisdictional immunity by Dale Gibson, P.
Mitch McAdam, Kent McNeil, and Albert C. Peeling in Frederica Wilson and Melanie
Mallet, eds., Métis-Crown Relations: Rights, Identity, Jurisdiction, and Governance
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008).
16 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 [Haida Nation].
17 2004 SCC 74, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550.
18 See also Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian
Heritage), 2005 SCC 69, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388 [Mikisew Cree], involving the duty to
consult in the context of treaty rights. For an excellent discussion, see Maria Morellato,
“The Crown’s Constitutional Duty to Consult and Accommodate Aboriginal and Treaty
Rights” (2008), online: National Centre for First Nations Governance website <http:
//fngovernance.org/research>.
Guerin19 and Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of
Indian Affairs and Northern Development).20
In Guerin, the Crown was held to have fiduciary obligations in the
context of surrender of reserve lands because those lands are
inalienable other than by surrender to the Crown. Because the Crown
has placed itself between First Nations and potential purchasers of their
lands, it exercises discretionary control over disposition of those
lands.21 This control, Dickson J. said, is the source of the Crown’s
fiduciary obligations in this context. The Crown also has an obligation,
however, to respect the decision-making authority of First Nations. In
Guerin, the Department of Indian Affairs entered into a lease of reserve
lands for a golf course on terms significantly different from those
agreed upon by the Musqueam Band. Dickson J. observed:
After the Crown’s agents had induced the Band to surrender its land on the
understanding that the land would be leased on certain terms, it would be
unconscionable to permit the Crown simply to ignore those terms. When the
promised lease proved impossible to obtain, the Crown, instead of proceeding to
lease the land on different, unfavourable terms, should have returned to the Band to
explain what had occurred and seek the Band’s counsel on how to proceed. The
existence of such unconscionability is the key to a conclusion that the Crown
breached its fiduciary duty.22
In the context of surrender of reserve lands for a particular purpose, the
role of the Crown as fiduciary is therefore to consult with the First
Nation and obtain the best terms in accordance with that Nation’s
instructions. In other words, the Crown has an obligation to respect and
abide by the decision-making authority of the First Nation.23
The role of the Crown in this context was elaborated in Blueberry
River. That case also involved a surrender of reserve lands, which were
then transferred to the Director (as defined by the Veterans’ Land Act),
72009] The Crown’s Fiduciary Obligations...
19 Supra note 1.
20 [1995] 4 S.C.R. 344 [Blueberry River].
21 Guerin, supra note 1 at 376, 383-84, where Dickson J. said the Crown
undertook this responsibility when it issued the Royal Proclamation of 1763, George
R., Proclamation, 7 October 1763 (3 Geo. III), reprinted R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1,
and continued it in relation to Indian reserve lands by provisions of the Indian Act, now 
R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5.
22 Guerin, ibid. at 388; see also ibid. per Wilson J. at 355.
23 See William R. McMurtry and Alan Pratt, “Indians and the Fiduciary
Concept, Self-Government and the Constitution: Guerin in Perspective” [1986] 3
C.N.L.R. 19.
and granted to veterans without reservation of the mineral rights,
contrary to the Crown’s usual practice. The Supreme Court held that
failure to retain the mineral rights and to correct the error when it
became known to the Department of Indian Affairs were breaches of
the Crown’s fiduciary obligations. Regarding the respective authority
of First Nations and the Crown in relation to surrenders of reserve
lands, McLachlin J. said:
My view is that the Indian Act’s provisions for surrender of band reserves strikes a
balance between the two extremes of autonomy and protection. The band’s consent
was required to surrender its reserve. Without that consent the reserve could not be
sold. But the Crown, through the Governor in Council, was also required to consent
to the surrender. The purpose of the requirement of Crown consent was not to
substitute the Crown’s decision for that of the band, but to prevent exploitation.24
After referring to a passage from Guerin where Dickson J. said the
purpose of interposing the Crown between First Nations and potential
purchasers was to prevent exploitation, McLachlin J. continued:
It follows that under the Indian Act, the Band had the right to decide whether to
surrender the reserve, and its decision was to be respected. At the same time, if the
Band’s decision was foolish or improvident – a decision that constituted exploitation
– the Crown could refuse to consent. In short, the Crown’s obligation was limited to
preventing exploitative bargains.25
Gonthier J., delivering the principal judgment in Blueberry River,
agreed that “the law treats Aboriginal peoples as autonomous actors
with respect to the acquisition and surrender of their lands, and for this
reason, their decisions must be respected and honoured.”26 But he
attached this qualification:
I should also add that I would be reluctant to give effect to this surrender variation
if I thought that the Band’s understanding of its terms had been inadequate, or if the
conduct of the Crown had somehow tainted the dealings in a manner which made it
unsafe to rely on the Band’s understanding and intention.27
It therefore appears from Guerin and Blueberry River that, where a
First Nation and the Crown both have authority in relation to a matter
that affects the First Nation’s interests, the fiduciary obligations of the
Crown relate mainly to the exercise of its own authority. The autonomy
8 THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW [Vol.88
24 Blueberry River, supra note 20 at 370-71.
25 Ibid. at 371.
26 Ibid. at 358.
27 Ibid. at 362.
of the First Nation must be respected as much as possible. In Guerin, it
was in fact the Crown’s failure to respect the Musqueam Band’s
decision-making authority that led to breach of the Crown’s fiduciary
obligations and liability. In Blueberry River, the Crown’s pre-surrender
role was generally limited to intervening to prevent exploitative
bargains. Both cases involved the exercise of statutory powers under
the Indian Act by First Nations and the Crown. The fiduciary principles
applied by the Supreme Court do not, however, appear to depend upon
this statutory context. As Dickson J. said in Guerin, “where by statute,
agreement, or perhaps by unilateral undertaking, one party has an
obligation to act for the benefit of another, and that obligation carries
with it a discretionary power, the party thus empowered becomes a
fiduciary.”28 One can therefore anticipate that, in the context of
governmental authority exercised by Aboriginal peoples outside the
Indian Act, courts will take an approach to Aboriginal autonomy and
Crown obligations not unlike that taken in Guerin and Blueberry River.
The courts will expect the Crown to respect Aboriginal autonomy, and
will not impose fiduciary obligations on the Crown that are inconsistent
with that autonomy except in situations where Crown intervention is
necessary to prevent exploitation. For the Crown to intervene at all,
however, it must have the authority to do so. In the context of
surrenders of reserve lands, this authority is explicitly provided by the
Indian Act’s requirement that such surrenders be accepted by the
Governor in Council to be effective.29 Where surrenders of Aboriginal
title lands are concerned, equivalent authority can be found in the Royal
Proclamation of 1763, and in the inalienability of Aboriginal title other
than by surrender to the Crown.30 But in the absence of statutory or
prerogative Crown authority in relation to the exercise of governmental
authority by Aboriginal peoples in other contexts, the discretionary
power giving rise to the Crown’s fiduciary obligations probably does
not exist.31
Let us now consider the exercise of governmental authority by
Aboriginal peoples in a context outside the Indian Act, namely by virtue
of their inherent right of self-government.
92009] The Crown’s Fiduciary Obligations...
28 Guerin, supra note 1 at 384.
29 Indian Act, supra note 21, s. 39(1)(c).
30 See Kent McNeil, “Self-Government and the Inalienability of Aboriginal
Title” (2002) 47 McGill L.J. 473.
31 Legislative authority is another matter, though we have seen that, since the
enactment of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, Parliament and provincial
legislatures have also been subject to fiduciary obligations in the context of
infringements of Aboriginal and treaty rights; see text accompanying notes 2-4, supra,
and cases cited therein.
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3. Fiduciary Obligations and the Inherent Right of Self-Government
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples32 and most academic
commentators33 have expressed the view that the Aboriginal peoples
have an inherent right of self-government that is constitutionally
protected by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. This right stems
from the pre-existing sovereignty of the Aboriginal peoples,34 and
continues because it was not taken away by European assertions of
sovereignty or any act of extinguishment.35 The Supreme Court,
however, has yet to decide that this right exists in any specific instance.36
10 [Vol.88
32 See Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Partners in
Confederation: Aboriginal Peoples, Self-Government, and the Constitution (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services, 1993); Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1996) [RCAP Report], Vol. 2,
Restructuring the Relationship, Pt. 1, 202-13.
33 See Michael Asch, Home and Native Land: Aboriginal Rights and the
Canadian Constitution (Toronto: Methuen, 1984); Michael Asch, “Aboriginal Self-
Government and the Construction of Canadian Constitutional Identity” (1992) 30 Alta.
L. Rev. 465; Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial Claims” (1991) 29
Osgoode Hall L.J. 681; Brian Slattery, “First Nations and the Constitution: A Question
of Trust” (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 261[Slattery, “Question of Trust”]; Brian Slattery,
“Making Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights” (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 196; John
Borrows, “Constitutional Law from a First Nation Perspective: Self-Government and
the Royal Proclamation” (1994) 28 U.B.C. L. Rev. 1; John Borrows, “Sovereignty’s
Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 537; Patricia Monture-Angus, Journeying Forward: Dreaming First Nations’
Independence (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1999); Dan Russell, A People’s Dream:
Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000); Patrick
Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2001); James (Sákéj) Youngblood Henderson, Treaty Rights in the
Constitution of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2007), especially at 490-96; Gordon
Christie, “Aboriginal Nationhood and the Inherent Right to Self-Government” (2007),
online: National Centre for First Nations Governance website <http://fngovernance .org
/research>. I have reached the same conclusion in my own work: see especially
“Aboriginal Rights in Canada: From Title to Land to Territorial Sovereignty” (1998) 5
Tulsa J. of Comp. & Int’l L. 253; and “Envisaging Constitutional Space for Aboriginal
Governments” (1993) 19 Queen’s L.J. 95, both reprinted in McNeil, Emerging Justice?,
supra note 15 at 58 and 184.
34 McLachlin C.J.C. acknowledged this sovereignty in Haida Nation, supra
note 16 at para. 20: “Treaties serve to reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty
with assumed Crown sovereignty.”
35 See Campbell v. British Columbia (A.G.), 2000 BCSC 1123, [2000] 4
C.N.L.R. 1; and the works cited supra notes 31-32.
36 See Kent McNeil, “Judicial Approaches to Self-Government since Calder:
Searching for Doctrinal Coherence” in Hamar Foster, Heather Raven, and Jeremy
Webber, eds., Let Right Be Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the Future of 
Indigenous Rights (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 129 [McNeil “Judicial Approaches”]; 
In R. v. Pamajewon, the Court “assume[d] without deciding that s. 35(1)
includes self-government claims.”37 In Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia,38 the Court declined to rule on the self-government claim of
the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en nations, but Lamer C.J.C. did say that
Aboriginal nations have decision-making authority over their
Aboriginal title lands. In Campbell v. British Columbia (A.G.),39
Williamson J. of the British Columbia Supreme Court decided that this
authority is governmental in nature, and thus an aspect of the inherent
right of self-government.40 It is also significant that, in Delgamuukw,
the Supreme Court sent the self-government claim back to trial,
advising the plaintiffs to frame that aspect of their case more narrowly.
If no inherent right of self-government exists as a matter of law, the
Court could have decided the matter then and there, instead of inviting
the plaintiffs to try again with a modified approach in a new trial that
would inevitably be long and costly (the case has not, in fact, been
retried).41 I therefore think it is safe to conclude that the Aboriginal
peoples do have an inherent right to govern themselves that is protected
by section 35(1).
It is my contention that the Crown has no prerogative authority to
infringe section 35(1) rights in general, and self-government rights in
particular, but needs clear and plain statutory authority to do so.42 This
means that, in circumstances where an Aboriginal group is exercising
an inherent right of self-government, the Crown will have no authority
112009] The Crown’s Fiduciary Obligations...
Kent McNeil, “The Jurisdiction of Inherent Right Aboriginal Governments” (2007),
online: National Centre for First Nations Governance website <http://
fngovernance.org/research>.
37 [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821 at para. 24.
38 Supra note 4 at paras. 115, 170-71.
39 Supra note 35, especially at paras. 114, 137-38. As the Campbell decision
was not appealed, it remains the leading case on self-government in Canada.
40 For more detailed discussion, see McNeil, “Judicial Approaches,” supra note
36 at 136-43.
41 The Delgamuukw trial took 374 days of court time; see Delgamuukw, supra
note 4 at para. 5. See also Kerry Wilkins, “Conclusion: Judicial Aesthetics and
Aboriginal Claims” in Kerry Wilkins, ed., Advancing Aboriginal Claims:
Visions/Strategies/Directions (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2004) 288 at 307, n. 19.
42 Respecting Aboriginal land rights, see Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title as a
Constitutionally Protected Property Right” in McNeil, Emerging Justice?, supra note
15 at 292. On legislative infringement, see Kent McNeil, “Challenging Legislative
Infringements of the Inherent Aboriginal Right of Self-Government” (2003) 22
Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 329 [McNeil, “Challenging Legislative Infringements”]. It
is fundamental to the rule of law that the Crown has no authority apart from statute to
infringe legal rights; see Entick v. Carrington (1765), 19 St. Tr. 1029; Roncarelli v.
Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121.
in relation to the exercise of that right in the absence of a statutory
provision providing the Crown with such authority. Ever since its
enactment in 1876, however, the Indian Act has provided the Crown in
right of Canada with statutory authority to infringe the inherent
Aboriginal right of self-government by imposition of the band council
system of government on First Nations.43 Imposition of this system has
generally occurred without the consent of First Nations through the
exercise of discretionary authority by the Governor in Council.44 For
example, in 1924 the Governor in Council imposed the band council
system on the Six Nations in southern Ontario by an order-in-council
made under the authority of the Act.45 In Davey v. Isaac,46 members of
the Six Nations representing the hereditary chiefs challenged the
validity of this order on the basis that the Indian Act did not apply to the
Six Nations, as they did not constitute a “band” as defined in the Act.
The Supreme Court of Canada held the Six Nations to be a “band” at
the relevant time because they fitted at least one of the statutory
definitions of that term, namely, “a body of Indians... for whose use and
benefit in common, moneys are held by His Majesty.”47 The Court
therefore found the order-in-council to be valid. However, the issue of
whether the Governor in Council had properly exercised its
discretionary authority was not argued before the Supreme Court, nor
was the issue raised of whether the Crown owed fiduciary obligations
in this context.
Davey was decided before Guerin, at a time when it was generally
thought that the Crown’s obligations towards Aboriginal peoples in the
context of exercise of statutory authority were moral and political rather
than legal.48 Guerin altered the legal landscape in this regard. As we
have seen, the Supreme Court decided that the Crown does owe legally-
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43 Indian Act, 1876, S.C. 1876, c. 18, ss. 62, 97; Indian Advancement Act, 1884,
S.C. 1884, c. 28, s. 3. Equivalent discretionary authority is contained in the current
Indian Act, supra note 20, ss. 4, 74.
44 In Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2
S.C.R. 203 [Corbiere] at 228, L’Heureux-Dubé J. observed that infringements of the
right of self-government, if they occurred in the context of the band council electoral
system, were due, not to the enactment of the Indian Act itself, but to the orders-in-
council bringing First Nations within the Act’s electoral rules. See discussion in
McNeil, “Challenging Legislative Infringements,” supra note 42, especially at 334-54.
45 At the time, the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1906, c. 81, s. 93. This order was replaced
by an equivalent order-in-council in 1951 made under the new Act: Indian Act, S.C.
1951, c. 29, s. 73. For discussion, see Darlene M. Johnston, “The Quest of the Six
Nations Confederacy for Self-Determination” (1986) 44 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 1.
46 [1977] 2 S.C.R. 897 [Davey].
47 Indian Act, S.C. 1951, c. 29, s. 2(1)(a).
48 See Reynolds, supra note 1 at 9-17.
enforceable fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal peoples when it
exercises discretionary authority that affects their interests. The
question, then, is how the fiduciary doctrine articulated in Guerin
applies in the context of imposing the band council system on First
Nations.
In considering this question, it is important to be aware of the
impact that government policies, especially the band council system,
have had on the capacity of First Nations to govern themselves.49 The
reality is that this system has become the operative form of government 
in most First Nation communities.50 As a result, the ability of many
First Nations to exercise their inherent right of self-government has
been seriously impaired. They have become dependent on the Canadian
government as a result of the band council system and the control
exercised by the Department of Indian Affairs. At the same time,
however, many First Nations want to move away from that system and
re-establish forms of government that are better suited to their cultures
and traditions.51 This is the context in which the application of
fiduciary principles needs to be assessed.
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.org>. These aspirations are supported by emerging international law, which has begun
to acknowledge that Indigenous peoples have a right of self-determination, entitling
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them; see Erica-Irene Daes, “The Right of Indigenous Peoples to ‘Self-Determination’
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47; S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 2nd ed. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004); Andrew Huff, “Indigenous Land Rights and the New
Self-Determination” (2005) 16 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 295. This right is
supported by article 3 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, adopted by the General Assembly on September 13, 2007, Resolution 61/295,
UN Doc A/RES/61/295. Although Canada voted against the Declaration along with
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, 144 countries voted in favour. Canada’s
opposition therefore does not diminish the value of the Declaration as an international
instrument that sets norms and standards for the treatment of Indigenous peoples. See
Claire Charters, “Indigenous Peoples and International Law and Policy” in Benjamin J. 
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I do not think the Canadian government can avoid responsibility for
the dependency its own policies have created, especially when this
dependency has arisen from the Crown’s exercise of discretionary
statutory power, specifically the imposition of a governmental system
that has interfered with the inherent right of self-government of First
Nations. Arguably, imposition of the band council system by the
Governor in Council was a breach of the Crown’s fiduciary obligations
in most, if not all, instances.52 But we do not need to go back to the time
of imposition to find legal liability, as the breach has been ongoing, and
continues today. While assimilationist assumptions may have led the
Canadian government to believe in the past that it was doing the right
thing,53 First Nation opposition to the 1969 Statement of the
Government of Canada on Indian Policy – commonly known as the
“White Paper” – put the government on notice that assimilation is not
acceptable.54 Since at least the 1970s, First Nations have been vocal in
their demands for acknowledgement of their inherent right of self-
government. This was apparent during the four constitutional
conferences convened in the 1980s to clarify and define the Aboriginal
rights that had been recognized and affirmed by section 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982. During those conferences, First Nations were
adamant in their assertion that their inherent right of self-government
must be constitutionally protected.55 As the band council system is
inconsistent with this inherent right, it should have been obvious that
continued imposition of that system on First Nations that want to re-
establish their own forms of government was an infringement of their
right of self-government.56 Consequently, the Canadian government
could no longer rely on its own prejudicial assumptions and claim that
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52 See McNeil, “Challenging Legislative Infringements,” supra note 42 at 339-43.
53 See John L. Tobias, “Protection, Civilization, Assimilation: An Outline
History of Canada’s Indian Policy” in Ian A. L. Getty and Antoine S. Lussier, eds., As
Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows: A Reader in Canadian Native Studies
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 1983) 39; and John S. Milloy, “The Early Indian Acts:
Developmental Strategy and Constitutional Change” in Getty and Lussier, ibid. at 56.
54 See Sally M. Weaver, Making Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda
1968-1970 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981); Alan Pratt, “Aboriginal Self-
Government and the Crown’s Fiduciary Duty: Squaring the Circle or Completing the
Circle?” (1992) 2 Nat’l J. Const. L. 163 at 169-71.
55 See Kent McNeil, “The Decolonization of Canada: Moving Toward
Recognition of Aboriginal Governments” (1994) 7 Western Leg. Hist. 113 (also in
McNeil, Emerging Justice, supra note 15 at 161).
56 In addition to infringing the inherent right of self-government, the band
council system fails to meet basic standards of political legitimacy: see the research
papers cited supra note 49.
it was acting on what it thought were the best interests of First Nations
in maintaining the band council system.57 So even if imposition of that
system did not breach the Crown’s fiduciary obligations, continuation
of it in face of First Nation opposition constituted a breach. This
conclusion is consistent with Guerin and Blueberry River, where, as we
have seen, the Supreme Court decided that the Crown has an obligation
to respect First Nation autonomy and decision-making authority.
Enactment of section 35(1) in 1982 further weakened any defence
the Canadian government might have had to allegations of breach of its
fiduciary obligations in the context of imposition of the band council
system. Prior to that time, Parliament had the power to give the Crown
statutory authority to infringe Aboriginal rights, including the right of
self-government, without having to justify its actions.58 Since the
enactment of section 35(1), this has no longer been possible. Any
infringement of an existing Aboriginal right, whether by Parliament
directly or by the Crown acting on statutory authority, has to be justified
in accordance with the test established by the Supreme Court in
Sparrow.59 That test involves proof by the government of a valid
legislative objective and of respect for the Crown’s fiduciary
obligations. Moreover, the justification requirement applies not only to
post-section 35(1) infringements, but also to past infringements that
have continued after the section came into force. Were this not so, there
would be a patchwork of protected and unprotected Aboriginal rights
(depending on whether they were infringed post- or pre-section 35(1))
– a result that the Supreme Court explicitly rejected in Sparrow.60
Given that the inherent right of self-government is a section 35(1)
Aboriginal right, any continuing infringement of that right by
imposition of the band council system would have to be justified.61
Proof of justification by the Canadian government would need to relate
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Report.
58 See R. v. Sikyea, [1964] S.C.R. 642; R. v. George, [1966] S.C.R. 267; Daniels
v. White, [1968] S.C.R. 517; R. v. Derriksan (1976), 71 D.L.R. (3d) 159 (S.C.C.);
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59 Supra note 3. See also the cases cited supra note 4.
60 Supra note 3 at 1091-93.
61 In Corbiere, supra note 44 at 225 (per McLachlin and Bastarache JJ.) and
281-82 (per L’Heureux-Dubé J.), the Supreme Court indicated that, in the absence of
justifiable infringement, self-government rights that are protected by s. 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982 would take precedence over the band council provisions in the 
Indian Act. For more detailed discussion, see McNeil, “Challenging Legislative
Infringements,” supra note 42 at 343-54.
to the time when the infringement is challenged by First Nations, not
the time when infringement by the band council system first took
place.62 Regarding the first branch of the Sparrow test, what current
legislative objective would justify continuing imposition of that system
on a First Nation that prefers to exercise its inherent right of self-
government? Up to now, the kinds of legislative objectives the Supreme
Court has accepted as valid in the context of section 35(1), such as
conservation, have involved substantial and compelling interests of
Canadian society generally.63 I think the government would be hard
pressed to come up with substantial and compelling interests that would
justify the continued imposition of the band council system on a First
Nation against its wishes, in circumstances where the First Nation had
a viable alternative form of government more suited to its culture and
traditions.64 In this situation, one would expect the democratic values
of Canada to support the right of self-government.65
But even if the Canadian government were able to prove a
substantial and compelling legislative objective for continued
infringement of the inherent right of self-government, it would still
have to meet the second branch of the Sparrow justification test,
namely, respect for the Crown’s fiduciary obligations. Among other
things, this would require the government to prove that its legislative
objective had been met with as little infringement of the right of self-
government as possible, and that it had consulted with individual First
Nations in regard to the infringement of their rights.66 It seems doubtful
that the government could ever meet the first of these requirements, as
the band council system was designed, not to minimally impair, but to
replace traditional forms of government. Moreover, the imposition of
this system on individual First Nations generally took place without
consultation. On the other hand, the requirements of minimal
impairment and consultation only became constitutional when section
35(1) came into force in 1982. From then on, the Crown’s fiduciary
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66 See Sparrow, supra note 3 at 1119; Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at 1112-13.
obligations, in particular the constitutional duty to consult, placed an
obligation on the Canadian government to enter into negotiations with
First Nations that want to replace the band council system with inherent
right Aboriginal governments that are culturally and politically
appropriate, and that meet their current aspirations and needs.67
As discussed earlier, many First Nations have become dependent
on the band council system. So although imposition of that system
likely violated the Crown’s fiduciary obligations to them, and could be
challenged and probably found to be invalid (at least after the
enactment of section 35(1)) for the reasons outlined above, many First
Nations might not want to pursue that option. A declaration by a
Canadian court that imposition of that system was unlawful would not
repair the damage already done, and could cause political, economic
and social turmoil in the community, if it meant that the band council
had no legal authority. Fortunately, this is not the only remedy available
to First Nations. Another option would be for them to prove that
imposition of the band council system violated the Crown’s fiduciary
obligations, and ask for restitution, which is one remedy for breach of
fiduciary obligations in equity generally.68 Restitution can take the
form of equitable compensation, the goal of which “is to repair and
restore the person wronged to his or her position status quo ante the
fiduciary’s infringement that has caused the loss.”69 Taking a
restitutionary approach in Guerin, the Supreme Court ordered the
Crown to pay the Musqueam Band compensation of $10 million, which
was the amount they would have received if their reserve lands had
been put to the most profitable future use (residential development),
instead of being leased on unfavourable terms for a golf course.70
Equitable compensation is not a particularly suitable remedy for
breach of fiduciary obligations by the Crown’s imposition of the band
council system. What First Nations have lost as a result of this breach
is not money as such, but the capacity to govern themselves on a
continuing basis in accordance with their own cultures and traditions.
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70 Guerin, supra note 1; see also Whitefish Lake Band of Indians v. Canada
(A.G.), 2007 ONCA 744, [2008] 1 C.N.L.R. 383.
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In this context, restitution needs to be fashioned to restore this capacity,
so that First Nations can not only choose their own forms of government,
but also operate as autonomous and effective political communities, as
they did before the imposition of the band council system.71 The
specifics of this remedy would undoubtedly vary somewhat from one
First Nation to another, depending on their individual circumstances and
needs. At a minimum, however, the remedy would have to include the
financial and other resources necessary for First Nations to develop
their governing capacity, and to be able to provide services for their
communities that are comparable to the level of government services
available to other Canadians in the twenty-first century.72 Preferably, the
details of the remedy would be the product of good-faith negotiations,
consistent with the honour of the Crown.73 If, however, the Canadian
government did not negotiate in good faith to achieve this goal, First
Nations could initiate legal action against the Crown in right of Canada
for breach of its fiduciary obligations, and ask a court for appropriate
restitution for the damage caused by the government’s continuing
infringement of the Aboriginal right of self-government and its failure
to negotiate acceptable terms to restore their capacity to govern
themselves.
4. Conclusion
Fiduciary obligations are not precluded by government-to-government
relationships between the Aboriginal peoples and other governments in
Canada.74 As the Supreme Court has said on numerous occasions,
fiduciary obligations typically arise where a person in a fiduciary
relationship exercises discretionary power so as to affect the interests of
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a beneficiary. The relationship between the Crown and the Aboriginal
peoples is fiduciary; it originated from the Crown’s unilateral assertion
of sovereignty, and hence the Crown’s position of power, over the
Aboriginal peoples. This position of power will persist for as long as
the Crown maintains its sovereignty. In situations where the Crown
exercises its power over cognizable Aboriginal interests, the fiduciary
relationship gives rise to fiduciary obligations.
The Aboriginal peoples have a right to govern themselves, and this
is a cognizable interest. The Indian Act conferred discretionary power
on the Crown in relation to this interest, power that the Governor in
Council exercised by imposing the band council system on First
Nations. If this was not a breach of the Crown’s fiduciary obligations at
the time of the imposition, surely it became so after Aboriginal rights
were recognized and affirmed by the Constitution Act, 1982 and First
Nations asserted their inherent right of self-government. Thereafter, the
Crown’s duty to respect Aboriginal autonomy, as posited by the
Supreme Court in Guerin and Blueberry River, became a constitutional
duty. Any unjustifiable infringement of it would result in Crown
liability.
It is doubtful whether the Canadian government would be able to
justify infringement of the Aboriginal right of self-government in
situations where First Nations oppose the infringement and have viable
systems of government of their own. As decided in Guerin, they are
entitled to restitution for breaches of the Crown’s fiduciary obligations.
In the context of infringement of their right of self-government,
restitution can best be achieved through good-faith negotiations, aimed
at restoring and maintaining the capacity of First Nations to govern
themselves in accordance with their own cultures and traditions. Where
negotiations fail to achieve this objective, First Nations can seek
restitution in Canadian courts. But whether restitution is pursued
through negotiation or litigation, the Crown’s fiduciary relationship
with the Aboriginal peoples has an ongoing role to play in promoting
the inherent right of self-government.
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